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1. The problem 
Questions of international distributive justice are certainly not new. We need 
only think of the demand made by the developing countries in the 1970s for a 
New World Economic Order, which aimed at a more equitable distribution of 
the benefits derived from the international division of labor. Demands were at 
that time raised for improved chances for exports to the industrialized 
countries, stepped-up financial and technology transfers, and a larger share 
in the decision-making processes in international institutions, above all in the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Even though these 
demands have remained largely unheard, and the debate on a New World 
Order is as good as over, there are, at the outset of the 21st century, a 
number of highly topical reasons why the issue of international distributive 
justice is again attracting more and more attention. Many of these reasons 
are bound up with the phenomenon of "globalization." 
On the one hand the emotional and geographic distance between individuals 
is regarded as an essential criterion for the acceptance of social inequality: 
the closer to us someone is, the more we know of another person, the more 
willing we are to contribute to his well-being. If, therefore, the world does in 
fact grow closer together - via a variety of processes such as more rapid 
means of transportation, the Internet, the networking of economic relations, 
or even through experiences made on vacation trips - then the question of 
international distributive justice is, for this reason alone, likely to grow in 
significance. The integration process within the European Union is a good 
example of this; it was accompanied by a sharp increase of transfer 
payments between the individual European countries. Besides, the motive 
need not necessarily be a moral one, one geared to the welfare of the other. 
And so one argument frequently advanced for international transfers is that it 
is better to help people "where they are" than to have to care for them as 
refugees.  
On the other hand globalization is placing new demands on the sphere of 
politics that will prove impossible to meet at the national level alone and 
therefore call for coordinated action on the part of the countries concerned. 
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Formally, the relevant policy fields can be conceived as "global public goods" 
or "global commons": as goods from the use of which no one can be 
excluded outright. Since these goods may also benefit agents who have not 
contributed to providing them, individual agents have an incentive to go along 
as "free riders." Without for effective institutional framework conditions, this 
would lead to a systematic undersupply of public goods. The funding of 
international institutions extending from blue-helmet missions, 
macroeconomic stabilization programs, to the management of global 
environmental goods provides examples of this. They generally pose the 
question as to the "equity" of the manner in which the costs and benefits of 
international policy measures are distributed. 
In what follows we will concentrate on criteria for an equitable distribution of 
transboundary common resources. Relevant examples at the global level 
include the climate system, but also minerals on the ocean floor, 
telecommunications, and genetic resources. Examples at the regional level 
would include the use of the water of transboundary rivers and the 
exploitation of migratory fish stocks. And finally - and not least - international 
environmental policy can also be seen as a question of the just distribution of 
resources and nature's capacity to absorb pollutants. 
This is the reason why international climate policy is frequently referred to as 
an example in what follows. Now that the anthropogenic influence on the 
global climate system is a matter disputed by the few only (see Helm and 
Schellnhuber 1998), the political debate turns chiefly on the allocation of the 
emission rights for the greenhouse gases responsible for climate change. In 
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol 38 industrialized countries agreed on initial, modest 
reduction targets; over the medium to long term, however, substantially more 
far-reaching efforts as well as participation of the developing countries will be 
on the agenda if the world's climate system is to be effectively stabilized 
(Simonis 1998). 
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2. Local versus global equity 
At the start of the search for an equitable distribution of common resources 
the first question is what information on the agents involved should be taken 
into consideration. A simple example may serve to illustrate this point: 
Two persons walking down the sidewalk at the same time find a hundred-
pound note. Most of us would no doubt find it fair if each of the two finders 
were to receive half of the money found. But if we now introduce the 
additional information that one of the two finders is poor while the other is 
rich, then our judgment would be apt to take on a different hue. Most of us 
would now probably find it more fair for the poorer of the finders to be given 
all of the money found, or at least the greater share of it. 
In the first variant of the story the distribution of the money found is viewed 
independently of the distribution of any other goods, while the second variant 
takes this factor into account. There are many reasons to regard the latter 
perspective as the more appropriate one. Yet even in this case it can make 
sense in analytical terms to keep these things apart. After all, the only reason 
why we accord all of the money found to the poor person is the simple fact of 
his poverty - and this has nothing to do with the money found. Our motivation 
is thus no longer the equitable distribution of a common resource (the find) 
but the realization of an income transfer for which the money found is to be 
used, even though the former would be justified without the latter. 
If, in what follows, we start out by looking into the equitable distribution of 
common, transboundary resources independently of existing worldwide 
income disparities, this in no way implies that we regard the latter as 
negligible. Indeed, there are very good reasons to argue in favor of using the 
distribution of transboundary resources and/or global resources as an 
instrument to effect international income transfers (Simonis 1996). But the 
question is then a different one: The issue in this case would no longer be the 
equitable division of a common resource; it would instead be a means to 
achieve further-reaching, overriding distribution goals. 
The question of such overriding distribution goals is, to be sure, even more 
difficult to answer at the level of international politics than it is at the level of 
the nation state. John Rawls (1999), for instance, has argued that it is above 
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all nation states themselves that are responsible for the welfare of their 
citizens. By comparison, he goes on to note, the international community has 
more a supportive function: its task is to secure a setting in which national 
societies can develop positively (Beitz 1999). For Rawls, however, this also 
includes a substantial stepup of international transfers to disadvantaged 
countries.  
As a means of separating the conceptual problems of a "global welfare 
policy" from the question of the equitable distribution of a common resource, 
we conceive the latter as a "local" equity problem (Young 1994). We here 
proceed in two steps: We start out by discussing the equitable distribution of 
the initial endowment with rights of use to a common resource; in the second 
step we then develop criteria for a just exchange of the initial endowment 
with user rights. 
In the debate on the climate issue the second point in particular has thus far 
attracted hardly any attention. Reflections on equity have for the most part 
been restricted to the question of the initial endowment with emission rights, 
while the subsequent exchange of these rights - and hence also the 
distribution of the ensuing efficiency gains - is to be governed by the market.  
This approach is closely associated with the second theorem of welfare 
economics, according to which any desired (Pareto-efficient) final allocation 
of resources can be achieved through the appropriate choice of an initial 
endowment as a market equilibrium. The distributive effect of the market is 
then anticipated already in allocating the initial endowment. 
Our approach in this article goes in the opposite direction: We focus not on 
the final distribution of resources but on the just allocation of user rights and 
their equitable exchange. For this reason the equity criteria must also refer to 
these levels and, in particular, explore the ways in which the efficiency gains 
accruing in the exchange of initial endowments are distributed. 
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3. Equitable distribution of the initial endowment with user rights  
Let us start out with the question of the equitable distribution of the initial 
endowment with the entitlements to a common resource. With the above 
example in mind, there is not much to debate here: What, if not the same per 
capita endowment, could be regarded as equitable if we neglect all 
superordinate information such as different welfare levels etc.? After all, 
already Aristotle, in his "formal principle of justice," demanded that equals be 
treated equally. 
Still, there are at least two arguments that can be advanced against an equal 
per capita allocation. On the one hand it is argued that the continued use of a 
common resource gives rise to a certain claim to retention of the status quo. 
On the other hand it is claimed that the allocation of emission rights should 
be geared to the needs reflected in the current emission levels of the 
countries concerned (see the contributions in Tóth 1999). 
To ground the first variant we might adduce John Locke's theory of the initial 
appropriation of unowned goods as well as the contemporary philosopher 
Robert Nozick, who builds on Locke's ideas and is regarded as one of the 
most important representatives of the so-called libertarians. According to 
Nozick (1974), an allocation can be regarded as just only when (i) the initial 
acquisition of the holdings and (ii) the exchange of these holdings have been 
conducted in a just manner (not, for instance, by means of theft) and (iii) prior 
violations of these principles have been corrected (for instance by means of 
compensation). In dealing with the question of the original appropriation 
Nozick has recourse to Locke (1632 - 1704), who wrote at a time in which the 
New World was regarded as a huge unowned area. 
In his Two Treatises of Civil Government (1690) Locke writes that nature 
was, in principle, given equally by God to all men to be worked and 
appropriated by them. In its original state nature is thus said to be common 
property. In contrast, man, with all his capabilities, 'owns himself'. This is why 
his labor and, in the end, everything created by it is his property. By mixing 
his labor with nature man wrests it from its state as common property, 
gaining property rights to it which exclude others from their use. It is in and 
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through this line of argument that Locke provides a theoretical foundation for 
the materialistic and strictly individualistic thinking and practice of economic 
liberalism (see Schwan 1993). 
To be sure, Locke added to his theory of natural rights the proviso that 
“enough, and as good”, must be left in common for others - the so-called 
'Lockean Proviso'. As long as, for instance, there is enough fertile farmland 
for all, this proviso is not unduly restrictive. But as far as climate change and 
other global environmental issues are concerned, the problem is of course 
precisely that nature's capacity to absorb pollutant emissions is not 
adequate. Locke's theory of natural rights and the approaches building on it 
can, in other words, hardly be cited to back an allocation of emission rights in 
international climate policy that is geared to the status quo.1  
The demand that the allocation of emission rights be geared to needs as 
reflected in current emission levels is based on even weaker theoretical 
grounds. True, Ronald Dworkin (1981), for instance, called for deviation from 
any egalitarian endowment with resources whenever the latter serves to 
offset natural inequalities - i.e., for instance, to compensate for differences in 
aptitudes. Unlike in the case of climatic conditions or natural resources, 
however, it can hardly be argued that the industrialized countries have 
"inherited" their high levels of pollutant emissions. They are, instead, a result 
of their own production and consumption decisions. 
In the international climate-policy debate an equal per capita distribution of 
emission rights is in fact the most commonly voiced proposal (IPCC 1996: 
106). In an earlier draft of the Framework Convention on Climate Change this 
was even explicitly specified as a goal, before then being replaced by the 
toned-down provisions of Article 3(1). According to this article, protection of 
the climate system is to be sought by the signatories "... on the basis of 
equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities." 
                                                 
1  Nozick (1974) later softened his version of the 'Lockean Proviso'. His criterion for the 
just appropriation of property rights is that it should make no one worse off than he 
would be without the appropriation. Obviously an allocation of emission rights on the 
basis of the status quo would violate this criterion.  
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But even though the acceptance of an approach entailing equal per capita 
rights does leave room for further discussion: it must, for instance, be 
decided whether the term initial entitlements refers to gross emissions or net 
emissions, which would mean taking into account countries' different biotic 
sink capacities (due to forest and soil conditions). Nor have we addressed 
the problem of accounting for historical emissions which impair nature's 
present and future absorptive capacity. As a general guideline, however, we 
can note that the initial endowment with user rights to a common resource 
should follow the principle of equal per capita allocation. 
4. Criteria for an equitable exchange of the initial endowment 
with user rights 
The second step of our analysis is now concerned with the criteria for an 
equitable exchange of the initial endowment with user rights. The point of 
departure here is that the interest individual agents have in using a common 
resource will differ considerably. When compensation payments are possible, 
this opens up the way to redistributions of the initial endowment from which 
all agents benefit. 
In economic theory a distribution is termed efficient or Pareto-optimal when 
no one can be made better off without making someone else worse off. This 
state of affairs is sometimes also referred to as the criterion of unanimity. 
This is enough to make it clear that the Pareto criterion is nothing more than 
the lowest common denominator, the only undisputed normative argument on 
which the economic profession has been able to concur. 
Since the case of a Pareto-inferior distribution would leave out the possibility 
of making some one better off without being to someone else's detriment, it 
seems to us that efficiency will do reasonably well as the smallest common 
denominator for the search for an equitable allocation of common resources. 
For international climate policy this means a distribution of emission 
reductions in which the marginal abatement costs, i.e. the costs for the last 
avoided unit of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases, are the 
same in all countries. This is a far-reaching outcome in that it defines the 
global allocation of emissions.  
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The best-known instrument suited to reaching a Pareto-efficient allocation is 
to be seen in competitive markets (first theorem of welfare economics). Yet 
Pareto efficiency is not the primary aim of our analysis, it merely serves the 
purpose of keeping as large as possible the pie to be equitably distributed. 
We must therefore ask whether the market also equitably distributes the 
gains resulting from a utilization regarded as more efficient than the initial 
endowment. 
In what follows we will present four analytical criteria relevant for our subject. 
Though they differ considerably, they are nevertheless based on the 
overarching idea that the use of a common resource should result in a 
minimum of solidarity. In principle this is also true of Pareto efficiency, for it 
implies the obligation on my part to support others, at least in cases which 
entail no costs for me.  
4.1 The criterion of envy-freeness 
The best-known criterion of equity in economic theory is envy-freeness - and 
this goes so far that equity is sometimes defined as lack of envy plus 
efficiency (Varian 1974). When equal claims are made on a common 
resource, a distribution is regarded as envy-free when every agent 
experiences his own share as just as valuable as that of any other agent; that 
is to say, when no one feels the need to exchange his share for another 
person's. 
One essential aspect of this criterion - and for the ones that follow as well - 
consists in the fact that it can get along without any comparisons of 
interpersonal utility, which are naturally disputable: the criterion demands no 
propositions on whether one person needs a good more urgently than 
another person, it simply asks whether one person would prefer his own 
bundle of goods to that of someone else. 
However, in many cases the number of envy-free distributions may be rather 
large. This also holds true for the distribution of emission rights and 
concomitant compensation payments in international climate policy, at least 
when the distribution problem is restricted to two major agents, North and 
South. There are a number of different possible allocations in which the North 
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would compensate the South for its greater share of emission rights by 
providing it with monetary compensation, and would do so without one of the 
two parties preferring the emission rights and compensation payments of the 
other. 
4.2 The criterion of individual rationality 
The criterion of individual rationality states that every agent should be 
guaranteed at least the utility deriving from the realization of his claims to use 
a common resource. Other names for this criterion are fair-share guaranteed 
and acceptability in that as a rule no one would consent to a reallocation if 
this would entail being made worse off than one would be with a guaranteed 
minimum share.2  
Applied to the climate problematique, the criterion of individual rationality 
requires that those countries which in an efficient allocation are given fewer 
emission rights than their fair share be fully compensated for the abatement 
costs accruing to them in this connection. Conversely, those countries which 
in an efficient allocation are given more emission rights than their fair share 
should not have to pay compensations higher than the abatement costs 
which they save due to the additional emission rights conceded to them. This 
is to say: no agent should lose on the way from the original to the efficient 
allocation. 
4.3 The criterion of resource and population monotonicity 
The criterion of resource and population monotonicity defines limits on how 
the utility of the individual agent will respond to a change of the size of a 
common resource or the number of the agents that have a just claim to it. For 
the case that a common resource grows in size, resource monotonicity 
demands that every agent should be at least just as well off as from the fair 
division of the smaller resource (Roemer 1986). 
                                                 
2  The criterion of individual rationality is in no way equivalent to Pareto efficiency. For 
instance, an allocation that gives all to one agent may be Pareto-efficient, though not 
individually rational. 
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This criterion is one of great relevance for international climate policy (and 
other problems involved in the allocation of common resources). Estimates of 
the atmosphere's capacity to absorb pollutant emissions are still uncertain 
and have to be regularly adapted to the latest state of scientific knowledge. In 
addition, long-term environmental and reduction goals are as a rule 
approached on a step-by-step basis, as is the case in the Kyoto Protocol. In 
both cases the size of the common resource to be allocated is altered and 
the welfare effects this fact entails should have roughly equivalent 
implications for all agents involved. 
The criterion of population monotonicity requires that when the number of 
persons (or states) with a just claim to a common resource increases, no 
agent should be better off than he was beforehand (Chichilnisky and 
Thomson 1987). Just as in the case of resource monotonicity, this criterion is 
based on the ethical argument that common ownership entails a minimum of 
solidarity, which would impel every agent to do his part to ensure that the 
legitimate claims of additional claimants are met. 
4.4 The stand-alone criterion 
The term stand-alone utility refers to an agent's utility when he is able to 
utilize the entire resource on his own (Moulin 1992). This can be derived as 
the upper bound of the utility level that an individual agent may obtain from 
the fair division of a common resource. Let us assume that there is only one 
agent. This agent would per definitionem receive his stand-alone utility. Now, 
the criterion of population monotonicity requires that this agent's utility should 
not increase when the number of agents (persons or states) with legitimate 
claims to the common resource increases. Consequently, he must not obtain 
more than his stand-alone utility, as was to be shown. Operating on the 
criterion of resource monotonicity we arrive at the same result (Helm 2000).  
While the criterion of individual rationality defines a lower bound for the level 
of compensation payments, the stand-alone criterion thus establishes an 
upper bound. Applied to international climate policy, it requires that no 
country should receive compensation payments higher than the abatement 
costs it would save with the quantity of global emission rights. 
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Formulated more generally, the stand-alone criterion implies that no agent 
should benefit from the atmosphere's limited capacity to absorb pollutant 
emissions. Moulin (1992: 1333) justifies this by arguing that "fair division 
conveys the idea of no subsidization: The presence of other agents who are 
willing to pay higher monetary transfers than me for consuming the resources 
should not turn to my advantage." This arguments appears particularly 
convincing when a greater willingness to pay is more a duty to confine a 
problem affecting all agents, like climate change. 
5. A proposal for the fair division of common resources 
To sum up: building on an equitable initial allocation of the rights of use to a 
common resource (here: the climate system), we have defined the following 
"minimum standards" for the exchange of this resource: 
The aim is to exhaust the potential for reallocations that can make 
someone better off without making anyone else worse off (Pareto 
efficiency). 
Every agent should prefer his own share of the common resource to the 
share of any other agent (envy-freeness). 
No agent should be made worse off by the redistribution of the initial 
endowment than he was beforehand (individual rationality). 
No agent should be made better off than he would be if he were able to 
use the whole resource on his own (stand-alone criterion, derived from 
resource and population monotonicity). 
Taken for itself, none of these criteria appears especially restrictive. That is 
why we have termed them "minimum standards" - they constitute, as it were, 
the lowest common denominator that can be used to approach the difficult 
problem of distributive justice. The problem is thus to be sought less in the 
contentious nature of the individual criteria per se than in their combination. 
On the one hand we frequently find no solution that simultaneously meets all 
the criteria, so that one or more of them would have to be abandoned in favor 
of others. On the other hand, however, there can also be a great number of 
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allocations that meet all four criteria. But at least in cases of relatively simple 
distribution problems referring to a homogeneous good and permitting 
compensation payments, the four criteria set out above complement each 
other harmoniously, making it possible to derive concrete policy 
recommendations from them. This also goes for the allocation of emission 
rights in international climate policy - and in particular for the politically highly 
complex issue of North-South distributive justice. 
As long as the South's emissions are relatively low, the South should not 
have to undertake any major abatement efforts to restrict them to the level of 
the emission rights to which it is entitled. The criterion of individual rationality 
thus guarantees the South a utility level that corresponds to the level that 
would be realized without any abatement efforts. On the other hand the 
stand-alone criterion implies that no agent should be made better off than he 
would be on an emission trajectory without any abatement efforts of his own.  
The lower bound defined by the criterion of individual rationality for the 
South's utility level thus coincides with the upper bound defined by the stand-
alone-criterion. This leads to a clear-cut outcome:  
The North would have to offset all of the South's abatement costs; but, 
conversely, the South would not be justified in demanding any addtitional 
transfers and would have to consent to the reduction measures required for 
reasons of efficiency.  
This solution is, furthermore, envy-free in that neither the South nor the North 
would prefer the other's emission rights and compensation payments. What 
is somewhat more difficult is the question of the mode of distribution within 
the North, or generally of those countries whose emissions exceed the initial 
endowment with emission rights. Here it would make sense to choose as a 
point of departure the allocation of property rights with a subsequent 
redistribution via competitive markets. This mechanism not only ensures 
efficiency, it also fulfills the equity criteria of individual rationality and envy-
freeness. Due to the (initially) highly pronounced differences in the per capita 
emissions of the North and the South, however, the market-driven allocation 
would violate the stand-alone criterion. 
Therefore a mode of distribution seems most plausible in which all countries 
are assured the minimum resulting from competitive allocation and stand-
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alone utility. This so-called "WESA mechanism" (WESA = Walrasian 
mechanism with the stand-alone utility as an upper bound) meets all of the 
criteria of equity set out at the beginning of this section.3  
If the initial endowment with emission rights is made in accordance with the 
principle of an equal per capita distribution and if the subsequent exchange 
of the initial endowment is conducted on the basis of the WESA mechanism, 
we come up with at a clear-cut final allocation of the emissions and the 
concomitant compensation payments for each of the countries involved (see 
Helm 2000). 
In keeping with the procedure involved in the second theorem of welfare 
economics we can then ask how the initial endowment would have to be 
distributed if we are to arrive at this desired final distribution in the course of a 
subsequent reallocation via competitive markets (Walrasian mechanism). 
Figure 1 depicts the difference between the initial endowment with emission 
rights implementing the WESA mechanism and an equal per capita 
distribution.  
Outcome: Initially the developing countries would be given less, the 
industrialized countries more, than an equal per capita share of emission 
rights; since, however, the greenhouse-gas emissions of the developing 
countries are marked by high growth rates, this difference will diminish over 
the course of time.  
                                                 
3  Formally, the WESA mechanism provides that every agent obtains the emission rights 
in competitive allocation ei and compensation payments mi in accordance with the 
following rule: 
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where p* indicates the market price for certificates, ui( ) the utility derived from 
consuming the whole resource, N the number of agents, A = {i  N: mi = ui( ) – ui( i)} 
and |N\A| is the cardinality of the set N\A. Accordingly, the WESA mechanism 
allocates the common resource in keeping with the efficiency criterion and in 
determining the compensation payments distinguishes between two groups: (i) 
members of set A receive compensation that brings them to the exact level of their 
stand-lone utility, and (ii) members of set N\A receive (or pay) their compensations as 
in the market-driven outcome, though they also are given an equal per capita share of 
the difference between the compensation payments that members of set A would 
receive at a market equilibrium and the compensation payments that they need to 
reach their stand-alone utility (see Helm 2000). 
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Figure 1: Implementation of the WESA mechanism 
Source: Authors' calculations, based on Pareto-optimal path in RICE model of 
Nordhaus/Yang 1996. 
 
Figure 1 thus illustrates not only the importance of subjecting to equity criteria 
not only the distribution of the initial endowment with emission rights but also 
their subsequent exchange. It also shows the similarity of the outcome thus 
obtained with William R. Cline's formula (Cline 1992), according to which the 
endowment with emission rights should initially be geared to current emission 
levels and then converge over the medium to long term into an equal per 
capita distribution.4  
 
                                                 
4  If e is the global emission target, then, using the Cline formula, we come up with 
emission target ei for the individual countries as a weighted sum from their share of 
historical emissions hi/h, the world social product yi/y, and the world population pi/p, 
where wh,t,  wy,t and wp,t designate the weighting of these three indicators at time t: 
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6. Conclusions 
We started out by arguing that questions of international distributive justice 
will gain significance over the further course of globalization. However, 
propositions based on equity-related considerations often run up against 
pronounced skepticism. Two of the most frequently heard objections are: 
“Equity is merely a word that hypocritical people use to cloak self-interest”, 
and “equity is so hopelessly subjective that it cannot be analysed 
scientifically” (Young 1994: xi). 
But the situation is not quite as bleak as all that. Proceeding on a limited 
number of general, widely accepted equity criteria, the present article 
develops a proposal for distributing common resources and applies it to the 
example of international climate policy. The thrust of this proposal is that the 
South should initially be fully compensated for the greenhouse gas 
abatement measures it is obliged to undertake as a result of the efficiency 
criterion. 
This finding in many ways resembles the arrangements in place in the 
international regime for the protection of the ozone layer (Montreal Protocol), 
which has generally been praised for its fairness (Benedick 1999); countries 
with low emissions have been fully compensated for their additional 
abatement costs (Biermann 1998). 
In analytical terms we have pursued a "bottom-up approach" in the present 
article: equity criteria are here applied to the initial allocation of rights of use 
to a common resource (the climate system) and their subsequent exchange, 
instead of to the final distribution as such. One essential virtue of this method 
is that it makes it possible to view individual allocation problems independent-
ly of the superordinate level of the global distribution of welfare. But it is 
important never to lose sight of this limitation of the information drawn upon 
to deal with a distribution problem. Indeed, in many cases it is possible that 
while the mode of distribution of a common resource meets the criteria 
discussed here, it may nevertheless intensify global welfare disparities which 
are regarded as highly unjust. Our distribution-related proposal for inter-
national climate policy is, however, not affected by this proviso, for according 
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to it, it will initially be the rich industrialized countries that are required to 
assume the costs of reducing greenhouse-gas emissions.  
 
 
 
7. Literature 
Benedick, R. E., 1998, Ozone Diplomacy. New Directions in Safeguarding the 
Planet. Enlarged edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Biermann, F., 1998, Weltumweltpolitik zwischen Nord und Süd. Die neue Macht der 
Entwicklungsländer. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Beitz, C. R., 1999, International liberalism and distributive justice, World Politics, 50, 
269-296.  
Chichilnisky, G. and Thomson, W., 1987, The Walrasian mechanism from equal 
division is not monotonic with respect to variations in the number of consumers, 
Journal of Public Economics 32: 119-124. 
Cline, W. R., 1992, The Economics of Global Warming. Washington, D.C.: Institute 
for International Economics. 
Dworkin, R., 1981, What is equality? Part II: Equality of resources, Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 10, 283-345. 
Helm, C., 2000, Economic Theories of International Environmental Cooperation., 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, in print. 
Helm, C. und H.-J. Schellnhuber, 1998, Wissenschaftliche Aussagen zum 
Klimawandel, in: J. L. Lozán, H. Graßl und P. Hupfer (eds.), Warnsignale aus der 
Klimaentwicklung – Wissenschaftliche Fakten, Berlin: Parey, 364–367 
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), 1996, Climate Change 1995. 
Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Locke, J., 1690/1963, Two Treatises of Civil Government, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Moulin, H., 1992, An application of the Shapley value to fair division with money, 
Econometrica 60 (6): 1331-1349. 
Nordhaus, W. D. and Yang, Z., 1996, A regional dynamic general-equilibrium model 
of alternative climate-change strategies, American Economic Review, 86 (4), 741-
765. 
Nozick, R., 1974, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books.  
C:\Eigene Dateien\BUREAU\PAPERS\2000\00-404.doc 17
Rawls, J., 1971, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Rawls, J., 1999, Law of Peoples, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Roemer, J. E., 1986, The mismarriage of bargaining theory and distributive justice, 
Ethics, 97, 88-110. 
Schwan, A. 1993, Politische Theorien des Rationalismus und der Aufklärung, in: H.-
J. Lieber (ed.): Politische Theorien von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, Bonn: 
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. 
Simonis, U. E. 1998, Global environmental mangagement. On measures of climate 
policy and how to use them, in: Dieter Detke (ed.), The challenge of globalization 
for Germany´s Social Democracy. A policy agenda for the 21st century. New 
York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 167-185. 
Simonis, U. E., 1999, The Kyoto-Protokoll. What next?, Productivity. A Quarterly 
Journal of the Indian Productivity Council, 40 (2): 263-268. 
Tóth, F. L. (ed.), 1999: Fair Weather? – Fairness and Equity Concerns in Climate 
Change, London: Earthscan. 
Varian, H. R., 1974, Equity, envy, and efficiency, Journal of Economic Theory, 9, 63-
91. 
Young, H. P., 1994, Equity in Theory and Practice, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
